Abstract Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental but much-overlooked cryptographic primitive. It appears as a major contribution in the ground-breaking paper of Diffie and Hellman, but NIKE has remained largely unstudied since then. In this paper, we provide different security models for this primitive and explore the relationships between them. We then give constructions for secure NIKE in the Random Oracle Model based on the hardness of factoring and in the standard model based on the hardness of a variant of the decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem for asymmetric pairings. We also study the relationship between NIKE and public key encryption (PKE), showing that a secure NIKE scheme can be generically converted into an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. This conversion also illustrates the fundamental nature of NIKE in public key cryptography.
Introduction
Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a cryptographic primitive which enables two parties, who know each others' public keys, to agree on a symmetric shared key without requiring any interaction. The canonical example of a NIKE scheme can be found in the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman [1] : let G be a group of prime order p with generator g, and assume Alice has public key g x ∈ G and private key x ∈ Z p , while Bob has public key g y ∈ G and private key y ∈ Z p . Then Alice and Bob can both compute the value g xy ∈ G without exchanging any messages. More properly, Alice and Bob should hash this key together with their identities in order to derive a symmetric key H(Alice, Bob, g xy ). This example encapsulates in a nutshell all the basic features required of a NIKE scheme: users should agree on some common parameters (p, G and g here), then create their key pairs. Once these are computed and the public keys distributed, any pair of users can set up a shared key without further exchange of messages. The security properties desired of NIKE are, informally at least, clear: compromise of one user's private key should not affect the security of shared keys between pairs of uncorrupted users; compromise of one shared key should not undermine the security of other shared keys. Naturally, since the primitive is non-interactive, one cannot hope to obtain any kind of forward security properties. In practice, the public keys will be certified, and consideration needs to be given to modelling the key registration process.
NIKE has real-world applications. In wireless and sensor networks, conserving battery power is a prime concern, and so the energy cost of communication must be minimised. Thus using key establishment methods that minimise the number of bits that need to be transmitted is of fundamental importance. In particular, when faced with a jamming adversary, reducing the total number of rounds of interaction needed to establish a key is particularly helpful. NIKE is an excellent option in solving this problem, since a key can be established with minimal communication and interaction: assuming the public keys are pre-distributed, all that is needed is an exchange of identifiers for those keys, and often this exchange must take place anyway, in order to establish communications. A recent paper [2] gives a detailed evaluation of the energy costs of interactive and non-interactive key exchange protocols in the ID-based and PKI settings for wireless communications with a jamming adversary, demonstrating that significant energy savings can be made by adopting a non-interactive approach to key establishment. Its non-interactive nature makes NIKE an abstract building block that is qualitatively different from interactive key exchange: e.g., to achieve deniable authentication, [3] explicitly requires a non-interactive key exchange. But NIKE can also be used as a basis for interactive key exhange [4, 5, 6] : for example, in [5] , the authors use the shared key in a MAC to authenticate an exchange of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values. The TLS Handshake Protocol [7] , which is the de facto protocol of choice for secure communication on the Internet, allows as an option a Diffie-Hellman key derived from static, long-term public keys to be used as its pre-master-secret, from which all other keys in the protocol are derived.
1 Finally, NIKE can be used to build very simple non-interactive designated verifier signature schemes [8] , again using the shared key in a MAC to authenticate messages. Thus NIKE appears in various guises throughout the literature.
Despite its appearing in the very first paper on public key cryptography, the NIKE primitive has so far received scant attention as a cryptographic primitive in its own right. Bernstein [9] proposed an efficient NIKE scheme in the elliptic-curve setting and sketched a security model for NIKE. Cash, Kiltz and Shoup (CKS) [10] provided a formal security model for NIKE and analysed the Diffie-Hellmanbased scheme above, as well as a twinned variant of it, in the Random Oracle Model (ROM). In the ID-based setting, Dupont and Enge [11] introduced a security model for NIKE and analysed the SakaiOhgishi-Kasahara (SOK) scheme [12] in this model. In a follow-up work, Paterson and Srinivasan [13] provided a more refined security model and explored the connections between ID-based NIKE and Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). Gennaro et al. [14] developed NIKE protocols for the hierarchical ID-based setting. All of these papers use the ROM.
Our contributions: Our contention is that NIKE is long overdue for more serious attention and development. In this paper, we initiate the systematic study of NIKE in the public key setting, providing: models and their relationships; constructions for secure NIKE in the Random Oracle Model and in the standard model in the challenging setting where the adversary can introduce arbitrary public keys into the system; and a construction for IND-CCA secure public key encryption (PKE) from any secure NIKE. Let us expand on each of these contributions in turn.
Models: It would seem that definitions and security models for interactive key exchange (e.g., [15, 16, 17, 18] ) could provide a natural starting point for formalising NIKE. However, here we take the CKS definition [10] for NIKE as our starting point. One reason for using a case-tailored NIKE definition is simplicity: existing security models for interactive key exchange give considerable attention to properties which are irrelevant in the NIKE setting. (For instance, forward security, multiple sessions, and in particular the pairing of sessions play no role in a non-interactive setting.) Another reason for a case-tailored NIKE definition is that we can focus on adversarial key registration queries; these are usually only implicitly [18] (or not at all [15, 17] ) considered in the standard models for interactive key exchange. 2 However, in our setting, adversarial key registration poses the main technical obstacle to achieve NIKE security, as we will explain below.
The CKS security model for NIKE uses an indistinguishability-and game-based approach to define security, with the adversary being required to distinguish real from random keys in responses to its test queries. The model does allow the adversary to register public keys of his choice in the system and then to make queries for the shared keys between these "corrupted" users and honest (non-adversarially controlled) users, so-called corrupt reveal queries. This translates in the real world to minimising the assumptions made about certification procedures followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in the PKI supporting the NIKE: it means that the CA is not assumed to check that a public key submitted for certification has not been submitted before, and does not check that the party submitting the public key knows the corresponding private key. The model for NIKE in [10] is similar to, and presumably inspired by, the early work of Shoup [16] on interactive key exchange, where capturing so-called PKI attacks, also known as rogue-key attacks, was intrinsic to the security modelling. This modelling approach is referred to elsewhere in the literature as the plain setting (see [20, 21] and the references therein) or the bare PKI setting [3] . The CKS model is certainly more challenging than settings where proofs of knowledge or proofs of possession of private keys are assumed to be given during registration, or where the adversary must reveal its secret key directly (as with the knowledge of secret key assumption used in [22, 23] ). However, the CKS model has some shortcomings: the adversary is not allowed to directly query for the shared keys held between pairs of honest users, but instead only gets to see real or random values for these via test queries. Moreover the model does not allow an adversary to query for the private keys of honestly registered users.
Therefore, as a necessary precursor to the further development of NIKE, we start by exploring different models for NIKE and their relationships (Section 2). In summary, we introduce three new security models for NIKE and show that they are all polynomially equivalent to one another and to the original CKS model from [10] . One of our models, the m-CKS-heavy model, augments the CKS model and effectively allows all conceivable queries, without allowing the adversary to win trivially. It is our preferred security model for NIKE. Another of our models, CKS-light, allows only two honest users, no corruption of honest users, and a single test query. Thus it is particularly simple and so easy to use when analyzing specific NIKE schemes; moreover our results showing equivalence between the models ensure that security in this model implies security in the preferred m-CKS-heavy model.
We stress that all these models allow the adversary to register public keys of his choice in the system, so are in the plain setting. However, for completeness, we also briefly consider the HKR or honest key registration setting in which the adversary cannot register keys on its own. It is easy to see that the HKR setting provides strictly weaker security guarantees than our default security setting with dishonest key registration. For instance, the already mentioned Diffie-Hellman NIKE scheme without hashing (such that shared keys are of the form g xy ) can be shown secure in the HKR setting under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, but is easily seen to be completely insecure in our default setting.
3
Constructions for NIKE: In Section 4, we give two concrete constructions for NIKE schemes meeting our CKS-light security definition, and hence secure in our preferred m-CKS-heavy model (with dishonest key registration). Our two constructions are inspired by public key encryption (PKE) schemes which are secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA secure). We note that dealing with corrupt reveal queries requires techniques to guard against active attacks, which in part explains the connection to IND-CCA security. Indeed, we will also show how to go in the reverse direction, converting any secure NIKE scheme into an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme, see below. We stress, however, that we cannot simply take any IND-CCA secure PKE scheme and directly interpret it as a NIKE scheme. 4 Rather, our constructions for NIKE exploit specific properties of the underlying PKE schemes. In fact, our belief is that a generic construction for secure NIKE from PKE is unlikely to be forthcoming.
The first scheme acts as a warm-up. It is provably secure under the factoring assumption in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) and uses ideas from [24] to analyse the basic Diffie-Hellman scheme, where keys are of the form H(Alice, Bob, g xy ), in the group of signed quadratic residues. We note that closely related schemes were analysed in [10] , but in different groups and under different assumptions. Specifically, a twinned version of the scheme was proved secure under the CDH assumption, while it is stated that the basic Diffie-Hellman scheme is secure under the Strong DH assumption. We remark that the latter claim of [10] is problematic. Concretely, the Strong DH assumption is not (directly) sufficient to show that the basic Diffie-Hellman scheme is secure. Namely, the corresponding security reduction requires two DDH oracles -one for each of the two users sharing the key on which the adversary wants to be challenged -while the Strong DH assumption supplies only one. Certainly this problem could be solved instead by appealing to a suitable gap-DH assumption. We show how 3 Concretely, since shared keys do not depend on party identities in the unhashed DH-NIKE, an adversary A can (a) register the key g x of an honest party Alice as its own key, and (b) ask for the shared key between A and another honest party Bob with key g y . This immediately yields the shared key g xy between Alice and Bob. Because of the homomorphic properties of the DH-NIKE, a simple modification of this attack also works if A is not allowed to register keys of existing users. A similar attack applies to the scheme in [9] . 4 One reason is that it is not clear what should correspond to the NIKE public key: a PKE public key, a PKE ciphertext, or a combination of both? Besides, the corresponding security experiments for NIKE and PKE schemes are rather different: there usually is one challenge ciphertext in a PKE security experiment, while there are at least two challenge users in a NIKE security experiment.
to overcome this problem in the group of signed quadratic residues without the need to rely on a gap assumption. We then proceed to sketch how to transport this scheme to the standard model, under the additional assumption that the adversary only registers valid public keys. Because of the extra assumption, this scheme does not strictly speaking meet our security definitions, and would require validity to be enforced by some means in an interactive registration protocol (for example, via a proof of correctness of the public key). This limitation of our standard model, factoring-based solution reflects the technical challenge involved in achieving our "bare PKI" security notions.
Our second NIKE scheme is provably secure in the standard model and combines a specific weak Programmable Hash Function [25] whose output lies in a pairing group and a Chameleon hash function. This enables the simulation in our security proof for the scheme to handle the tricky queries for shared keys involving an honestly generated public key and an adversarially chosen public key. Similar ideas were used in the context of HIBE in [26] . We also make use of the pairing to provide a means of checking that public keys coming from the adversary are in some sense well-formed. We work with asymmetric pairings for efficiency at high security levels (and because it does not add any real complexity to the description of our scheme). The scheme's security relies on a natural variant of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption for the asymmetric setting.
From NIKE to PKE: In Section 5, we explore the connections between NIKE and public key encryption (PKE). That such connections exist should not be too much of a surprise: it is folklore that the ElGamal encryption scheme [27] can be seen as arising from the Diffie-Hellman NIKE scheme by making the sender's key pair (g x , x) ephemeral and using the receiver's public key g y to create the basis for a shared key g xy . In fact, a simple transformation shows that every NIKE that is secure in the simpler HKR setting can be turned into a public key encryption scheme that is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure). Similar connections were explored in the ID-based setting in [13] .
In our default setting with dishonest key registration, we provide a simple, generic construction for PKE from NIKE that is also in the spirit of the original Diffie-Hellman-to-ElGamal conversion. The construction takes a NIKE scheme that is secure in our CKS-light model (with dishonest key registration) and a strongly one-time secure signature scheme as inputs, and produces from these components a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) that we prove to be IND-CCA secure. A secure PKE from such a KEM can be obtained using standard results. At a high level, the key pair for the KEM is a randomly generated key pair (pk, sk) from the NIKE scheme, ciphertexts are also randomly generated public keys pk from the NIKE scheme (together with a one-time signature that binds the public key to an identity), while the encapsulated key is the shared key computed from sk and pk; the receiver computes the same key from sk and pk , assuming the one-time signature verifies. In order to prove the KEM to be IND-CCA secure, we exploit the presence of corrupt reveal queries in the NIKE security model in an essential way to handle certain decapsulation queries. The resulting KEM is almost as efficient as the underlying NIKE scheme. In the HKR setting, the same transformation (only without one-time signatures) shows that CKS-light security of the NIKE implies IND-CPA security of the resulting PKE scheme.
The fact that secure NIKE implies IND-CCA-secure PKE, one of the most important primitives in cryptography, illustrates the fundamental role and utility of NIKE. We believe that this connection should spur further research on the topic. We remark that by combining the above transformation with [28] , NIKE also implies a one-round authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocol secure in the standard model. The resulting AKE protocol is again almost as efficient as the underlying NIKE scheme.
In Appendix G, we provide a closely-related conversion that starts with a secure NIKE scheme satisfying a simplified definition (basically, it omits all consideration of identities) and produces an IND-CCA secure KEM without using one-time signatures. This results in more efficient KEMs. We can apply the conversion with the concrete NIKE scheme from Appendix G to obtain an attractive KEM that is IND-CCA secure in the standard model under our asymmetric variant of the DBDH assumption. This KEM is comparable in performance to the scheme proposed in [29] and neatly illustrates the utility of NIKE as a primitive, as well as its connections with other classical public key primitives.
2 Non-interactive Key Exchange and Security Models
Non-interactive Key Exchange
Following [10] , we formally define a Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) scheme in the public key setting to be a collection of three algorithms: CommonSetup, NIKE.KeyGen and SharedKey together with an identity space IDS and a shared key space SHK. Note that identities in the scheme and security model are merely used to track which public keys are associated with which users -we are not in the identity-based setting.
-CommonSetup: On input 1 k , outputs params, a set of system parameters. -NIKE.KeyGen: On input params and an identity ID ∈ IDS, outputs a public key/secret key pair (pk, sk). This algorithm is probabilistic and can be executed by any user. We assume, without loss of generality, that params is included in pk. -SharedKey: On input an identity ID 1 ∈ IDS and a public key pk 1 along with another identity ID 2 ∈ IDS and a secret key sk 2 , outputs either a shared key in SHK for the two identities, or a failure symbol ⊥. This algorithm is assumed to always output
For correctness, we require that, for any pair of identities ID 1 , ID 2 , and corresponding key pairs (pk 1 , sk 1 ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ), algorithm SharedKey satisfies the constraint:
Definitions of Security for Non-interactive Key Exchange
Cash, Kiltz and Shoup [10] proposed a security model for NIKE schemes in the public key setting, denoted here by the CKS model. This model abstracts away all considerations concerning certification and PKI in a particularly nice way. It allows an adversary to obtain honestly generated public keys, but also to then associate such public keys with other identities, and to register dishonestly generated public keys (for which the adversary need not know the corresponding private keys). This dishonest key registration (DKR) setting (abstractly) models a PKI where minimal assumptions are made about the actions of the Certificate Authority (CA): the CA is not assumed to check that a public key has not been previously registered to another user, and does not demand a proof of knowledge or possession of the private key when issuing a certificate on a public key. This conservative approach to modelling is fully appropriate given the great diversity in how CAs operate in the real world. The model can be seen as a natural adaptation of the approach of Shoup [16] for modelling interactive key exchange to the NIKE setting and is analogous to the plain setting studied in [20, 21] .
However, there are some obvious omissions from the model, including the ability of an adversary to "corrupt" honestly generated public keys to learn the corresponding private keys, and the ability of a user to directly learn the key shared between two honest parties in the system (which could be possible, for example, because of cryptanalysis of a scheme making use of the shared key). Equivalent queries in the ID-based setting were permitted in the model introduced in [13] .
For this reason, we augment the original CKS model with the "missing" queries, introducing the m-CKS-heavy model. We regard this as providing the "correct" model for NIKE. We also introduce two further models, the CKS-heavy and CKS-light models. These differ from m-CKS-heavy and the original CKS model only in the numbers and types of query that the adversary is allowed to make. Next we present in detail the m-CKS-heavy model. Then in Table 1 we summarize the differences between these security models in the DKR setting.
The m-CKS-heavy model: Our model is stated in terms of a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. In this game, C takes as input the security parameter 1 k , runs algorithm CommonSetup of the NIKE scheme and gives A params. The challenger takes a random bit b and answers oracle queries for A until A outputs a bitb. The challenger answers the following types of queries for A:
-Register honest user ID: A supplies an identity ID ∈ IDS. On input params and ID, the challenger runs NIKE.KeyGen to generate a public key/secret key pair (pk, sk) and records the tuple (honest, ID, pk, sk). The challenger returns pk to A. Table 1 . Types of queries for different security models in the dishonest key registration (DKR) PKI model (aka plain/bare model). Notation: means that an adversary is allowed to make an arbitrary number of queries; means that no queries can be made; numbers represent the number of queries allowed to an adversary.
-Register corrupt user ID: In this type of query, A supplies both an identity ID ∈ IDS and a public key pk. The challenger records the tuple (corrupt, ID, pk, ⊥). We stress that A may make multiple "Register corrupt user ID" queries for the same ID during the experiment. In that case, only the most recent (corrupt, ID, pk, ⊥) entry is kept. -Extract queries: Here A supplies an identity ID that was registered as an honest user. The challenger looks for a tuple (honest, ID, pk, sk) containing ID and returns sk to A. -Reveal queries: Here A supplies a pair of registered identities ID 1 , ID 2 , subject only to the restriction that at least one of the two identities was registered as honest. The challenger runs SharedKey using the secret key of one of the honest identities and the public key of the other identity and returns the result to A. Note that here the adversary is allowed to make reveal queries between two users that were originally registered as honest users. We denote by honest reveal the queries involving two honest users and by corrupt reveal the queries involving an honest user and a corrupt user. -Test queries: Here A supplies two distinct identities ID 1 , ID 2 that were both registered as honest.
The challenger returns ⊥ if ID 1 = ID 2 . Otherwise, it uses the bit b to answer the queries. If b = 0, the challenger runs SharedKey using the public key for ID 1 and the secret key for ID 2 and returns the result to A. If b = 1, the challenger generates a random key, records it for later, and returns that key to the adversary. In this case, to keep things consistent, the challenger returns the same random key for the pair ID 1 , ID 2 every time A queries for their paired key, in either order.
A's queries may be made adaptively and are arbitrary in number. To prevent trivial wins for the adversary, no query to the reveal oracle is allowed on any pair of identities selected for test queries (in either order), and no extract query is allowed on any of the identities involved in test queries. Also, we demand that no identity registered as corrupt can later be the subject of a register honest user ID query, and vice versa.
When the adversary finally outputsb, it wins the game ifb = b. For an adversary A, we define its advantage in this security game as:
where q H , q C , q E , q HR , q CR and q T are the numbers of register honest user ID queries, register corrupt user ID queries, extract queries, honest reveal queries, corrupt reveal queries and test queries made by A, respectively. We say that a NIKE scheme is (t, , q H , q C , q E , q HR , q CR , q T )-secure in the m-CKS-heavy model if there is no adversary with advantage at least that runs in time t and makes at most q H register honest user ID queries, etc. Informally, we say that a NIKE scheme is m-CKS-heavy secure if there is no efficient adversary having non-negligible advantage in k, where efficient means that the running time and numbers of queries made by the adversary are bounded by polynomials in k.
Comparing the models: Table 1 outlines the properties of our other security models in the DKR setting, in terms of restrictions on the queries that can be made by the adversary. It is apparent that the m-CKS-heavy model is the strongest model. It differs from the CKS-heavy model only in allowing multiple test queries. The m-CKS-heavy model represents a strengthening of the original CKS model by allowing extract and honest reveal queries, whereas the CKS model only allows the adversary to gain information about honestly generated shared keys via test queries. The CKS-light model is simplest of all, involving only two honestly registered identities, removing the extract and honest reveal queries, and allowing only a single test query. We prove in Appendix B that it is polynomially equivalent to the m-CKS-heavy model. In fact, we prove there the following theorem: Theorem 1. The m-CKS-heavy, CKS-heavy, CKS and CKS-light security models are all polynomially equivalent. More specifically, for any scheme NIKE, we have the following results (where advantages for the CKS-heavy, CKS and CKS-light security models are defined in the obvious way):
CKS-heavy ⇒ m-CKS-heavy: For any adversary A against NIKE in the m-CKS-heavy model, there is an adversary B that breaks NIKE in the CKS-heavy model with
where q HR ≤ q HR + q T . The converse, CKS-heavy ⇐ m-CKS-heavy is trivial. CKS-light ⇒ CKS: For any adversary A against NIKE in the CKS model, there is an adversary B that breaks NIKE in the CKS-light model with
where q C ≤ q C + q H and q CR ≤ q CR . The converse, CKS-light ⇐ CKS is trivial. CKS-light ⇒ CKS-heavy: For any adversary A against NIKE in the CKS-heavy model, there is an adversary B that breaks NIKE in the CKS-light model with
where q C ≤ q C + q H and q CR ≤ q CR . The converse, CKS-light ⇐ CKS-heavy is trivial.
Thus, while the m-CKS-heavy model is our preferred model, it suffices to analyse schemes in the CKS-light model if one is not overly concerned about concrete security. However, we note that various factors are involved in the reductions. In particular a factor of q T q H 2 is lost in going from the m-CKS-heavy to the CKS-light model. This reflects the proof techniques used in establishing the bounds, specifically the use of hybrid arguments. It is an interesting open problem to either prove tighter relations between the models, or to prove that such results are not possible.
Security models in the honest key registration ( HKR) setting: For completeness we also provide NIKE security models in the honest key registration setting where dishonest key registration queries are disallowed. An overview of the models is given in Table 2 . We remark that Theorem 1 carries over to the HKR setting simply by setting q C and q CR to zero in the theorem statement and proofs. So all the security models from Table 2 are equivalent to one another. As pointed out in the introduction, constructing NIKE schemes in the HKR setting is much easier than in the more realistic DKR setting.
Intractability Assumptions

The Group of Signed Quadratic Residues, the BBS generator, and the Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The factoring assumption: Let n(k) be a function and δ a constant with 0 ≤ δ < 1/2. Let RSAgen be an algorithm with input 1 k that generates elements (N, P, Q) such that N = P Q is an n-bit Blum integer and all prime factors of φ(N )/4 are pairwise distinct and have at least δn bits. These conditions ensure that (J N , ·) is cyclic and that the square g of a random element in Z * N , generates QR N with high probability. That is, g = QR N . For such N , we recall the definition of the group of signed quadratic residues QR + N from [24] (see also [30, 31] ) which is defined as the set {|x| : x ∈ QR N }, where |x| is the absolute value when representing elements of Z N as the set
is a cyclic group of order φ(N )/4 whose elements are efficiently recognisable given only N as input.
For any algorithm A, we write
The factoring assumption for RSAgen is that Adv 
is negligible for any PPT adversary B.
The Strong DH assumption: In [24] it is shown that if the factoring assumption holds, then the Strong DH assumption holds relative to RSAgen. This assumption is that there is no PPT algorithm having non-negligible advantage in solving the CDH problem on input (N, g, X, Y ) when given an oracle for DDH g,X (·, ·). Here g is a randomly selected generator of QR + N , X and Y are selected uniformly from QR + N , the solution to the CDH problem is defined as g (dlog g X)(dlog g Y ) , and the DDH oracle DDH g,X (Ŷ ,Ẑ) returns 1 ifŶ dlog g X =Ẑ and 0 otherwise. We will require a variant of the Strong DH assumption, which we name the Double Strong DH (DSDH) assumption. This can be stated as follows. Let (N, P, Q) ← RSAgen(1 k ) and let g be a randomly selected generator of QR + N , and X, Y be selected uniformly from QR + N . Then the Double Strong DH problem is to solve the CDH problem on input (N, g, X, Y ), that is to compute g (dlog g X)(dlog g Y ) , when given oracles for DDH g,X (·, ·) and DDH g,Y (·, ·). The DSDH assumption relative to RSAgen is that there is no PPT algorithm having non-negligible advantage in solving this problem. Theorem 2. If the factoring assumption holds relative to RSAgen, then the DSDH assumption also holds relative to RSAgen. In particular, for every algorithm A solving the Double Strong DH problem, there exists a factoring algorithm B (with roughly the same running time as A) such that
Proof. The original proof of [24, Theorem 2] shows how to handle a single DDH oracle DDH g,X (·, ·). By symmetry of the set-up used in the proof, the same procedure can also be used to (simultaneously) handle the oracle DDH g,Y (·, ·).
Parameter generation algorithms for Asymmetric Pairings
Our pairing based scheme will be parameterized by a type 2 pairing parameter generator, denoted by G2. This is a polynomial time algorithm that on input a security parameter 1 k , returns the description of three multiplicative cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 and G T of the same prime order p, generators g 1 , g 2 for G 1 , G 2 respectively, and a bilinear non-degenerate and efficiently computable pairing e :
We assume that G2 also outputs the description of an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 and that g 1 = ψ(g 2 ). Throughout, we write PG2 = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , g 1 , g 2 , p, e, ψ) for a set of groups and other parameters with the properties just described.
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption for Type 2 Pairings (DBDH-2)
, e, ψ) as above. We consider the following version of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem for type 2 pairings, as introduced by Galindo in [33] 
abc , where g 1 = ψ(g 2 ). More formally, we associate the following experiment to a type 2 pairing parameter generator G2 and an adversary B.
Experiment Exp
The advantage of B in the above experiment is defined as
We say that the DBDH-2 assumption relative to G2 holds if Adv
is negligible in k for all PPT algorithms B.
Constructions for Non-interactive Key Exchange
A Construction in the Random Oracle Model from Factoring
We specify how to build a NIKE scheme, NIKE fac , that is secure in the CKS-light security model under the factoring assumption relative RSAgen in the ROM. Our scheme makes use of a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k which is modelled as a random oracle in the security proof. The component algorithms of the scheme NIKE fac are defined as follows:
Return (pk, sk)
Here we are assuming that the identities ID come from a space with a natural ordering <.
Theorem 3. The scheme NIKE fac is secure in the ROM under the factoring assumption relative to RSAgen. In particular, suppose A is an adversary against NIKE fac in the CKS-light security model. Then there exists a factoring adversary C with:
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix C.
Towards a factoring-based scheme in the standard model
The security proof of NIKE fac above crucially uses the statistical properties of the random oracle H. If we accept an interactive key registration, we can however give a factoring-based NIKE scheme in the standard model. The basis of this scheme is the factoring-based IND-CCA secure encryption scheme of Hofheinz and Kiltz [32] . However, in adapting their scheme to the NIKE setting, we will have to find a way to simultaneously cope with two challenge ciphertexts (which correspond to the public keys of the challenge identities). To cope with this modified setting, we will set up a simulation that is able to decrypt all but two ciphertexts (resp. NIKE public keys). In our description, let RSAgen as before, let ChamH : {0, 1} * × R Cham → Z 2 k be a chameleon hash function (see also Appendix A). Now consider the following scheme NIKE fac-int :
Note that correctness of the scheme follows from Z
. To prove security, we need to rely on the consistency of public keys. Concretely, the security reduction we will give can only authentically answer corrupt reveal queries for corrupt user keys pk = (Z, X, r) that satisfy Z = g
x for t = ChamH hk (Z||ID; r) and some x. Unlike in our upcoming pairing-based scheme, this kind of consistency is not (obviously) efficiently verifiable. Hence, the key registration process must ensure that only consistent user keys are registered, e.g., by having the user prove consistency in zero-knowledge (interactively, using x as witness).
On top of assuming consistent keys, we will also have to make an assumption about the distribution of (or rather, the ability to generate) primes. Namely, we will need to assume a PPT algorithm PrimeGen that, on input a 2k-bit prime ρ, outputs a prime α such that α mod ρ has statistical distance O(2 −k ) from the uniform distribution over Z ρ . Such an algorithm PrimeGen exists. This is an easy consequence of Dirichlet's theorem on the distribution of primes in arithmetic progressions: our generator simply samples integers of the form α 0 + i · ρ for uniformly chosen α 0 ∈ Z ρ and i = 1, 2, . . ., and checks them for primality. This algorithm can be rigorously proven to be efficient under the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis.
Theorem 4.
Under the factoring assumption relative to RSAgen, given an algorithm PrimeGen as above, and assuming that the chameleon hash function ChamH is collision-resistant, the scheme NIKE fac-int is secure against all adversaries that only register consistent (in the sense above) user keys. In particular, suppose A is such an adversary against NIKE fac in the CKS-light security model. Then there exists a BBS distinguisher B and a collision-finder A CH with:
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix D.
A Construction in the Standard Model from Pairings
We specify how to build a NIKE scheme, NIKE dbdh-2 , that is secure in the CKS-light security model under the DBDH-2 assumption in the standard model. Our construction makes use of a tu-
, output by a parameter generator G2, and a chameleon hash function ChamH : {0, 1} * × R Cham → Z p . This can be instantiated efficiently using the discrete-log based construction from [34] (see Appendix A for further details of chameleon hash functions). The component algorithms of the scheme NIKE dbdh-2 are defined as follows:
The check in the SharedKey algorithm for valid public keys can be implemented by evaluating the bilinear map twice. It is clear that SharedKey defined in this way satisfies the requirement that entities ID 1 and ID 2 are able to compute a common key. To see this, note that e(S x2 , Z 1 ) = e(S, g 2 ) x1,x2 . The identity space for this construction, IDS, is {0, 1}
* , while the space of shared keys is SHK = G T . Public keys and parameters are compact. For example, at the 128-bit security level, using BN curves [35] and point compression, public keys consist of 768 bits plus an element from R Cham .
As stated before, we can prove the above NIKE scheme to be secure under the DBDH-2 assumption in the sense of the CKS-light security model. Interestingly, our scheme can be generalised to use any weak (2, poly)-PHF [25] in combination with a chameleon hash function. That is, Y (in the NIKE.KeyGen algorithm) would be the output of the weak (2, poly)-PHF on input t, where t is the output of the chameleon hash function. We have given a specific construction here because suitable weak PHFs are currently rare. A further generalisation of our scheme could use any randomised (2, poly)-PHF and avoid the chameleon hash, but no constructions for these are currently known.
Theorem 5. Assume ChamH is a family of chameleon hash functions. Then NIKE dbdh-2 is secure under the DBDH-2 assumption relative to generator G2. In particular, suppose A is an adversary against NIKE dbdh-2 in the CKS-light security model. Then there exists a DBDH-2 adversary B with:
For the proof, see Appendix E.
From Non-interactive Key Exchange to Public Key Encryption
We give a conversion that takes a NIKE scheme that is secure in the CKS-light security model plus a strongly one-time secure signature scheme, and produces from it a KEM that is IND-CCA secure. From such a KEM, it is easy to construct an IND-CCA secure public key encryption scheme [36] .
The formal definitions of KEM and OTS and their security can be found in Appendix A.
The Conversion from NIKE to KEM
We now present our conversion from a NIKE scheme to a KEM. For a NIKE scheme NIKE and an OTS scheme OTS, we construct a KEM KEM(NIKE, OTS) with the following algorithms:
This algorithm runs the algorithm CommonSetup(1 k ) of NIKE to obtain a set of system parameters, params. Then it picks ID ∈ IDS uniformly and runs NIKE.KeyGen(params, ID) to obtain a key pair (pk, sk). It sets pk KEM = (params, ID, pk) and sk KEM = (ID, sk).
-Enc(pk KEM ): This algorithm parses pk KEM as (params, ID, pk), runs OTSKeyGen to obtain a pair (vk , sigk). This is repeated until vk = ID. Next, it runs NIKE.KeyGen(params, ID = vk ) of NIKE to obtain a key pair (pk , sk ) and runs OTSSign(sigk , pk ) to obtain σ, a signature on pk . It then runs SharedKey(ID, pk, ID = vk , sk ) of scheme NIKE to obtain a key K ∈ SHK. The output is (K, C = (vk , pk , σ)). -Dec(sk KEM , C): This algorithm first parses C as (vk , pk , σ) and sk KEM as (ID, sk). Next, it runs OTSVfy(vk , pk , σ) and returns ⊥ if the output is reject or if vk = ID. Otherwise, it runs SharedKey(ID = vk , pk , ID, sk) and outputs the result, which may be ⊥.
Notice that the ciphertexts in this scheme consist of a verification key from the OTS scheme, a public key from the NIKE scheme, and a one-time signature, while the encapsulated keys are elements of SHK. As our next result shows, the resulting KEM is automatically IND-CCA secure if the NIKE scheme is secure in the CKS-light security model. Theorem 6. Suppose the NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the CKS-light security model and OTS is a strongly secure one-time signature scheme. Then KEM(NIKE, OTS) is an IND-CCA secure KEM. More precisely, for any adversary A against KEM(NIKE,
For the proof, see Appendix F.
Applying the above construction to the pairing-based NIKE scheme from the previous section results in an IND-CCA secure KEM with public keys (ID, pk) that consist of an identity string, two group elements (one in G 1 and one in G 2 ), and a key for the Chameleon hash function. Ciphertexts are slightly longer, containing in addition a verification key and a signature from the one-time signature scheme.
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In Appendix G, we explain how a simplified notion for NIKE and its security leads to a more efficient KEM that is competitive with the BMW scheme from [29] , for example.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We provided different security models for NIKE and explored the relationships between them. We then gave constructions for secure NIKE in the ROM and in the standard model. We also studied the relationship between NIKE and PKE, showing that a secure NIKE implies an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme.
There are several interesting open problems that arise from our work. One is to construct pairingfree NIKE schemes in the standard model. A challenge to doing so is that our pairing-based construction uses the pairing in a fundamental way in order to provide a publicly computable check on the validity of public keys. The RSA/factoring setting seems particularly challenging in this respect -we recall that our standard model, factoring-based scheme required that the adversary only register valid public keys, a condition that could be enforced in practice by having an interactive key registration protocol and insisting on proofs of validity during that protocol. Clearly, it is desirable from both a practical and a theoretical perspective to obtain schemes that are secure in the plain setting, where no such protocol is required.
Another open problem is to construct ID-based NIKE schemes that are provably secure in the standard model, moving beyond the ROM schemes analysed in [11, 13] . Starting with known IBE schemes may be profitable, but the fact that these generally have randomised private key generation algorithms seems to make it hard to work backwards from IBE to ID-based NIKE.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider three-party NIKE schemes based on Joux's protocol [37] . Currently, there is no security model for such schemes, and no constructions which can handle adversarially-generated public keys. 
The hash function family is said to be collision resistant if Adv coll A H ,CRH is negligible in k for any polynomial-time adversary A H .
A.2 Target Collision Resistant Hash Functions
The difference between a target collision resistant hash function TCR f and a collision resistant hash function CRF f is that, in the former case, it is infeasible for an adversary, given a value m, to find a distinct value m such that TCR f (m) = TCR f (m ). More formally, we define
The hash function is said to be target collision resistant if Adv coll A H ,TCR is negligible in k for any polynomial-time adversary A H .
A.3 Chameleon Hash Functions
Chameleon hash functions [34] can be thought of as collision resistant hash functions with a trapdoor for finding collisions. Let k be a security parameter. A chameleon hash function ChamH : D×R Cham → I, where D is the domain, R Cham the randomness space and I the range, is associated with a pair of public and private keys (the latter called a trapdoor). These keys are denoted respectively by hk and ck and are generated by a PPT algorithm Cham.KeyGen(1 k ). The public key hk defines a chameleon hash function, denoted ChamH hk (·, ·). On input a message m and a random string r, this function generates a hash value ChamH hk (m, r) which satisfies the following properties: Collision resistance There is no efficient algorithm that on input the public key hk can find pairs m 1 , r 1 and m 2 , r 2 where m 1 = m 2 such that ChamH hk (m 1 , r 1 ) = ChamH hk (m 2 , r 2 ), except with negligible probability in k.
Trapdoor collisions There is an efficient algorithm that on input the secret key ck, any pair m 1 , r 1 and any additional message m 2 , finds a value r 2 such that ChamH hk (m 1 , r 1 ) = ChamH hk (m 2 , r 2 ). Also, for uniformly and independently chosen m 1 , r 1 and m 2 , r 2 is independently and uniformly distributed over R Cham .
Uniformity
All mesages m induce the same probability distribution on ChamH hk (m, r) for r chosen uniformly at random. This property prevents a third party, examining the value hash, from deducing any information about the hashed message.
More formally, we define the advantage of an adversary A CH against ChamH as
The composition of a chameleon hash function and a (regular) collision resistant hash function (where the latter is applied first) results in a chameleon hash function.
A.4 KEMs and KEM Security
A key encapsulation mechanism KEM = (KEM.KeyGen, Enc, Dec) consists of three algorithms:
-KEM.KeyGen, a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input 1 k , outputs a public key/secret key pair (pk, sk).
-Enc, a probabilistic polynomial-time encapsulation algorithm that takes as input a public key pk and outputs a symmetric key K ∈ K, where K is the symmetric key space of the KEM, and a ciphertext C. -Dec, a deterministic polynomial-time decapsulation algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext C, and outputs either a key K ∈ K or a special symbol ⊥.
For correctness we require that for all k ∈ N and all (K, C) ← Enc(pk), we have
Chosen-ciphertext security for a KEM is defined in terms of the following IND-CCA experiment (from [32]), where an adversary A is allowed to adaptively query a decapsulation oracle with ciphertexts of its choice and obtain the corresponding keys.
Definition 1 (IND-CCA security of a KEM). Let KEM = (KEM.KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a key encapsulation mechanism. For any PPT algorithm A, we define the following experiments:
In the above experiment, the decapsulation oracle Dec(sk, ·), when queried with a ciphertext C = C * , returns K ← Dec(sk, C); (Dec(sk, ·) ignores queries C = C * . The advantage of A in breaking KEM's IND-CCA security is defined to be:
where q D is a bound on the number of decapsulation queries made by A. A KEM scheme is said to be IND-CCA secure if Adv 
A.5 One-time signatures
A one-time signature (OTS) scheme OTS = (OTSKeyGen, OTSSign, OTSVfy) consists of three algorithms:
-OTSKeyGen, a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input 1 k , outputs a verfication/signing key pair (vk , sigk ).
-OTSSign, a probabilistic polynomial-time signing algorithm that takes as input a signing key sigk and a message m outputs a signature σ. -OTSVfy, a deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that takes as input a verification key vk , a message m and a signature σ, and outputs either reject or accept.
For correctness we require that for all k ∈ N, all (vk , sigk ) ← OTSKeyGen(1 k ), all messages m, and all σ ← OTSSign(sigk , m), we have Pr[OTSVfy(vk , m, σ) = accept] = 1.
Strong security for an OTS scheme is defined in terms of the following experiment.
Definition 2. Let OTS = (OTSKeyGen, OTSSign, OTSVfy) be an OTS. For any PPT algorithm A, we define the following experiment:
In the above experiment, the signing oracle OTSSign(sigk , ·) can only be queried once on some message m which results in a signature σ. The advantage of A in breaking OTS's strong one-time security is defined to be:
An OTS scheme is said to be strongly secure if Adv A,OTS (k) is negligible for all polynomial-time adversaries A.
B Relationships between NIKE Security Models
We show that the four NIKE security models discussed in Section 2.2 are polynomially equivalent. Note that the proofs contain many parts in common, but we give them here in full detail for completeness.
Theorem 7 (CKS-heavy ⇔ m-CKS-heavy).
A NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the m-CKSheavy model if and only if it is secure in the CKS-heavy model. In more detail, for any adversary A against NIKE in the m-CKS-heavy model, there is an adversary B that breaks NIKE in the CKS-heavy model with
where q HR ≤ q HR + q T . Conversely, for any B against NIKE in the CKS-heavy model, there is an A that breaks NIKE in the m-CKS-heavy model with
Proof. Clearly, security in the sense of the m-CKS-heavy model implies security in the sense of the CKS-heavy model, since the latter model is a limited case of the former. Here we prove that if a NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the CKS-heavy model, it is also secure in the m-CKS-heavy model. We use the hybrid argument technique to relate the model with a single test query (the CKS-heavymodel) to a model allowing multiple test queries (the m-CKS-heavy model) for a fixed bit b. We assume that there exists an adversary A against NIKE in the m-CKS-heavy model with advantage Adv
. Without loss of generality, we will assume that the q T test queries made by A are all distinct. We consider a sequence of indistinguishable games G 0 , G 1 , . . . , G q T , all defined over the same probability space. Starting from the actual adversarial game G 0 (attack game with respect to an adversary A against NIKE in the m-CKS-heavy model), when b = 1 (that is, test queries will always be answered with random keys), we make slight modifications between successive games, in such a way that the adversary's view is still indistinguishable among the games. The last game, Game G q T , will be exactly like Game G 0 , except that this time A's challenger will use b = 0 to answer A's test queries. Note that this means that A can distinguish games Game G 0 and Game G q T with advantage Adv
to denote adversary A playing in game G i . For every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ q T , we define a hybrid variable H i where the first i elements are the actual shared keys associated to the corresponding users involved in the first i test queries, and the q T − i following elements are random keys. That is,
(·,·) denotes the paired key between the two identities involved in the i-st test query and R (j) , i + 1 ≤ j ≤ q T , represents random keys. A's challenger will use H i to answer test queries in game Game G i . Game G 0 . Define G 0 to be the original game as described in the m-CKS-heavy security model when b = 1.
Game
. This game is identical to game Game G i−1 , except that whenever A makes its i-th test query on a pair of identities, say ID A and ID B , A's challenger will return to A the actual shared key, K (ID A ,ID B ) , between those identities. Note that Games G i and G i+1 differ in only one single test query.
We now construct an adversary B against NIKE in the sense of the CKS-heavy model. B plays the CKS-heavy security game with challenger C and acts as a challenger for A.
C takes as input the security parameter 1 k , runs algorithm CommonSetup of the NIKE scheme and gives B params. C then takes a random bit b and answers any oracle queries for B until B outputs a bitb.
B chooses a uniformly random i ∈ {0, . . . , q T − 1}, and invokes A on the vector
. That is, in order to answer the first i test queries, B makes honest reveal queries on the same pair of identities to C, obtaining real shared keys. B then returns the shared keys to A. Whenever A makes its (i + 1)-st test query, B will make the same test query to its challenger, receiving a value α. B gives α to A. For all other test queries, B will respond with a random value. For all other queries made by A, B passes these queries to C and then relays the responses to A. Now, if α is the actual key associated to the identities involved in the test query test i+1 (·, ·), then A was playing game G i+1 . Otherwise, if α is a random value, A was playing game G i . Whenever A terminates by outputting a bitb, then B outputs the same bit. Note that by our assumption the q T test queries made by A are all distinct. So, B will never make an honest reveal query on the same pair of identities that will be involved in its test query. Note also that as explained before, the only difference between games G i and G i+1 is a single test query.
Let G 0 and G 1 be the games played by B against NIKE in the CKS-heavy model when b = 0 and b = 1, respectively. We have:
and
It therefore follows that:
This concludes our proof.
Theorem 8 (CKS-light ⇔ CKS).
A NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the CKS model if and only if it is also secure in the CKS-light model. In more detail, for any adversary A against NIKE in the CKS model, there is an adversary B that breaks NIKE in the CKS-light model with
where q C ≤ q C + q H and q CR ≤ q CR . Conversely, for any B against NIKE in the CKS-light model, there is an A that breaks NIKE in the CKS model with
Proof. Clearly, security in the sense of the CKS model implies security in the sense of the CKS-light model. Here we prove that if a NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the CKS-light model, then it is also secure in the CKS model. We assume that there exists an adversary A against NIKE in the CKS model with advantage Adv
We consider a sequence of games G 0 , G 1 , . . . , G q T , all defined over the same probability space. Starting from the actual adversarial game G 0 (attack game with respect to an adversary A against NIKE in the CKS model), when b = 1 (that is, test queries will always be answered with random keys), we make slight modifications between successive games, in such a way that the adversary's view is still indistinguishable among the games. The last game, Game G q T , will be exactly like Game G 0 , except that this time A's challenger will use b = 0 to answer A's test queries. Note that this means that A can distinguish games Game G 0 and Game G q T with advantage Adv
We write A(G i ) to denote adversary A playing in game G i . For every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ q T , we define a hybrid variable H i where the first i elements are the actual shared keys associated to the corresponding users involved in the first i test queries, and the q T − i following elements are random keys. That is,
(·,·) denotes the paired key between the two identities involved in the i-th test query and R (j) , i + 1 ≤ j ≤ q T , represents random keys. A's challenger will use H i to answer test queries in game Game G i . Game G 0 . Define G 0 to be the original game as described in the CKS security model when b = 1.
We now construct an adversary B against NIKE in the sense of the CKS-light model. B plays the CKS-light security game with challenger C and acts as a challenger for A.
C takes as input the security parameter 1 k , runs algorithm CommonSetup of the NIKE scheme and gives B params. C then takes a random bit b and answers oracle queries for B until B outputs a bitb. Let q T and q H be bounds on the number of test queries and register honest user ID queries, respectively, made to B by A in the course of its attack. Without loss of generality, we assume that the q T test queries are all distinct. B chooses a random i ∈ {0, . . . , q T − 1} and two distinct indices I and J uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . , q H }. Effectively B is guessing that the I-th and J-th identities to be honestly registered by A will be involved in the (i + 1)-st test query made by A.
A makes a series of queries which B answers as follows:
-Register corrupt user ID: If A makes a register corrupt user ID query, supplying (ID, pk), then B makes the same register corrupt user ID query to C. C records the tuple (corrupt, ID, pk, ⊥).
-Register honest user ID: Here A supplies a string ID to B. If this is the I-th or J-th such query, then B makes the same register honest user ID query to C, setting ID I = ID or ID J = ID as appropriate. On input params and ID, C runs NIKE.KeyGen, generating a key pair (pk, sk), records (honest, ID, pk, sk) and returns pk to B. If ID / ∈ {ID I , ID J }, then B generates a key pair (pk, sk), by running algorithm NIKE.KeyGen on input params and ID, and makes a register corrupt user ID query to C on inputs the string ID and the public key pk. B then gives pk to A. -Corrupt reveal : Whenever A supplies two identities ID, ID , where ID was registered by A as corrupt and ID was registered as honest, B will check if ID ∈ {ID I , ID J }. If so, B will make the same corrupt reveal query to C, obtaining K (ID,ID ) , and give the result to A. If ID / ∈ {ID I , ID J }, B runs SharedKey on input (ID, pk ID , ID , sk ID ) . Note that in this case, B has sk ID because it generated for itself the pair (pk ID , sk ID ). B gives K (ID ,ID ) to A. -Test: B answers A's test queries according to the vector
That is, B will answer the first i test queries with the actual shared keys associated to the corresponding users involved in those test queries, the (i + 1)-st test query with a value that can be either the actual shared key associated to the users involved in that test query or a random value, and the other q T − i − 1 test queries with random values. Next, we explain in more detail exactly how B handles A's test queries. When A makes its j-th (j ≤ i) test query on a pair of identities {ID, ID }, that were registered as honest users, B will check if {ID, ID } = {ID I , ID J }. If so, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise, suppose |{ID, ID } ∩ {ID I , ID J }| ≤ 1. Then we consider 3 cases:
This means that B registered ID as corrupt user and ID as honest user. B runs SharedKey on input (ID, pk ID , ID , sk ID ). Note that B has sk ID because it generated for itself the pair (pk ID , sk ID ). B gives K (ID,ID ) to A.
ID ∩ {ID
This means that B registered ID as corrupt user and ID as honest user. B runs SharedKey on input (ID , pk ID , ID, sk ID ). Note that B has sk ID because it generated for itself the pair (pk ID , sk ID ). B gives K (ID,ID ) to A.
{ID, ID } ∩ {ID
Here both of the identities, ID and ID were registered by B as corrupt users, so that B cannot make a corrupt reveal query on them. Instead B runs SharedKey on inputs (ID , pk ID , ID, sk ID ), and returns K (ID,ID ) to A. When A makes its (i + 1)-st test query on a pair of identities {ID, ID }, B checks if {ID, ID } = {ID I , ID J }. If not, B aborts the simulation. If {ID, ID } = {ID I , ID J }, B makes the same test query to C receiving α. B gives α to A. For all other test queries B will respond with a random value.
Whenever A terminates by outputting a bitb, then B outputs the same bit. Now, if α is the actual key K (ID A ,ID B ) associated to (ID A , ID B ) (the identities involved in the (i + 1)-st test query made by A), then A was playing game Game G i+1 . Otherwise, if α is a random value, A was playing game Game G i .
We now assess B's success probability. Let G 0 and G 1 be the games played by B against NIKE in the CKS-light model when b = 0 and b = 1, respectively. Let F denote the event that B is not forced to abort during its simulation. It is easy to see that Pr(F ) ≥ 1/ q H 2 ≥ 2/q H 2 . We have:
Theorem 9 (CKS-heavy ⇔ CKS-light).
A NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the CKS-heavy model if and only if it is also secure in the CKS-light model. In more detail, for any adversary A against NIKE in the CKS-heavy model, there is an adversary B that breaks NIKE in the CKS-light model with
where q C ≤ q C + q H and q CR ≤ q CR . Conversely, for any B against NIKE in the CKS-light model, there is an A that breaks NIKE in the CKS-heavy model with
Proof. Clearly, security in the sense of the CKS-heavy model implies security in the sense of the CKS-light model. Here we prove that if a NIKE scheme NIKE is secure in the CKS-light model, it is also secure in the CKS-heavy model. Suppose there is an adversary A against NIKE in the CKS-heavy model with advantage Adv
We show how to construct an algorithm B against NIKE in the CKS-light model that uses A to break NIKE with advantage Adv
where k is the security parameter.
B plays the CKS-light security game with challenger C and acts as a challenger for A. C takes as input the security parameter 1 k , runs algorithm CommonSetup of the NIKE scheme and gives B params. C then takes a random bit b and answers oracle queries for B until B outputs a bitb.
Let q H be a bound on the number of register honest user ID queries made to B by A in the course of its attack. B chooses two distinct indices I and J uniformly at random from {1,2,. . .,q H }.A makes a series of queries which B answers as follows:
-Register corrupt user ID: If A makes a register corrupt user ID query supplying (ID, pk) as input, B makes the same register corrupt user ID query to C. C records the tuple (corrupt, ID, pk, ⊥). -Register honest user ID: Here A supplies a string ID to B. If this is the I-th or J-th such query, then B sets ID I = ID or ID J = ID as appropriate. Then B makes the same register honest user ID query to C. On input params and ID, C runs NIKE.KeyGen, generating a key pair (pk, sk), records (honest, ID, pk, sk) and returns pk to B. B gives pk to A. Otherwise, when this is not the I-th or J-th such query, B generates a key pair (pk, sk), by running algorithm NIKE.KeyGen on input params and ID, and makes a register corrupt user ID query to C on inputs the string ID and the public key pk. B then gives pk to A. -Extract: Whenever A makes an extract query on a user identity ID, that was registered by A as honest, B checks if ID ∈ {ID I , ID J }. If so, B aborts the simulation. If ID / ∈ {ID I , ID J }, B finds ID in the list (honest, ID, pk, sk) and returns sk to A. This completes our description of B's simulation. When A terminates by outputting a bitb then B outputs the same bit. We now assess B's success probability. Let F denote the event that B is not forced to abort during its simulation. It is easy to see that Pr(F ) ≥ 1/ q H 2 ≥ 2/q H 2 . Thus, we see that:
Adv
This concludes the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Suppose A is an adversary against NIKE fac in the CKS-light security model. We first show how to construct an adversary B that uses A to solve the Double Strong DH problem in the group of Signed Quadratic Residues (QR ) . B outputs a randomly generated value R ∈ {0, 1} k . Notice that the 'correct' key K A,B that would be computed by B in responding to this query is equal to H(A, B, g xy ) (w.l.o.g. assuming A < B).
* , ID 1 < ID 2 , and h ∈ QR + N , B answers A's H queries as follows. B checks if (ID 1 , ID 2 , h, R) is already on the list for some R; If so, it outputs R. Otherwise, B checks if an entry of the form (ID 1 , ID 2 , ⊥, R) is on the list for at least ID 1 or ID 2 equals one of the two honest identities A or B. So let ID 1 = A (ID 1 = B) , that is, pk 1 = X (pk 1 = Y ). If ID 2 is also a registered identity, then B checks if h is the 'correct' DH value for (ID 1 , ID 2 ) using one of the DDH oracles (note that B does not know the secret key x = dlog g X (y = dlog g Y )). That is, if DDH g,X (pk 2 , h) = 1 (DDH g,Y (pk 2 , h) = 1), then h = pk x 2 (h = pk y 2 ) and B adds (ID 1 , ID 2 , h, R) to the list and returns R. Note that entries of the form (ID 1 , ID 2 , ⊥, R) are only added to the list when one of the identities ID 1 or ID 2 is A or B and the other is registered. Finally, if no entry of either of the above forms already appears on the list, that is, no (ID 1 , ID 2 , h, R) and no (ID 1 , ID 2 , ⊥, R), then B picks a random value R ∈ {0, 1} k , returns R and adds (ID 1 , ID 2 , h, R) to L.
This completes our description of B's simulation. Let G denote the event that A queries the random oracle H with (A, B, h) or (B, A, h) for h = g xy , then it efficiently solved B's own CDH challenge. This can be noticed by B (with the help of oracle DDH g,X (·, ·) or DDH g,Y (·, ·)) and B can return g xy . Note that if A does not query H on (A, B, g xy ) or (B, A, g xy ), then A's advantage is zero because it cannot disinguish real from random answers to Test queries. Hence, if A has non-negligible success probability, then this query must be made by A. We then see that Adv
where the O(2 −δn(k) ) term accounts for the statistical difference between the distribution of g x and g y in the real game (where x, y ∈ Z N/4 ) and the simulation (where x, y ∈ Z φ(N )/4 ). Combining these facts with Theorem 2, we have that Adv
, concluding the proof.
D Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Our proof largely follows the IND-CCA security proof for the factoring-based PKE scheme from [32] . Loosely speaking, our system parameters params correspond to a PKE public key in the scheme of [32] ; NIKE user keys pk correspond to PKE ciphertexts; and the NIKE shared key computation roughly corresponds to PKE decryption. The main difference between the NIKE and PKE schemes is that in a NIKE scheme, two user keys are "paired" to generate a shared secret key. In a PKE scheme, a single ciphertext is decrypted "on its own." In particular, there are two NIKE honest identities (for which a Test query is issued), while there is only one PKE challenge ciphertext.
More formally, assume a CKS-light adversary A that only registers consistent keys. We use A to construct a BBS distinguisher B. Our distinguisher B gets as input a modulus N , along with a random D ∈ QR + N and a challenge C ∈ {0, 1} k . B's goal is to distinguish the cases
and uniform C. To this end, B will simulate the CKS-light game for A.
First, we will assume that in the original CKS-light game, any two public keys (honest or registered by A) lead to the different hash values t ← ChamH hk (Z||ID; r). A straightforward reduction to the collision resistance of ChamH justifies this assumption and leads to the Adv coll A CH ,ChamH term in (1) . Next, we let B use the chameleon hash trapdoor ck in its simulation. Concretely, we let B initially uniformly choose the hash values t 1 and t 2 for the two (at that point unknown) honest identitities ID 1 , ID 2 . (Later on, when A decides on ID 1 and ID 2 , we let B use ck to generate ChamH randomness r 1 , r 2 such that t i = ChamH hk (Z i ||ID i ; r i ) for the corresponding public keys.) B then sets up
Here, α 1 , α 2 ← PrimeGen(1 n+k , ρ) (for a uniform 2(n + k)-bit prime ρ) are primes generated using the assumed algorithm PrimeGen. By assumption about PrimeGen, we have that the α i mod ρ (and thus the α i mod φ(N )/4) are statistically close to uniform. (In particular, we can assume α i > 2 2k .) The arising (negligible) statistical defect is accounted for by the O(2 −k ) term in (1). Furthermore, b i ∈ Z N/4 and a i ∈ Z N/4 are uniformly chosen, such that a(t) := a 0 +a 1 t+a 2 t 2 := (t−t 1 )(t−t 2 ) ∈ Z[t]. We will also write b(t) := b 0 + b 1 t + b 2 t 2 ∈ Z[t] for brevity. B invokes A with the resulting parameters params = (N, g, u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , hk). The honest keys pk IDi = (Z i , X i , r i ) are computed using
and randomness r i that ensures ChamH hk (Z i ||ID i ; r i ) = t i . This implicitly sets
that the shared key between ID 1 and ID 2 is BBS N (g
Hence, B's challenge C can be directly embedded as A's test challenge key. It remains to describe how B answers A's Corrupt reveal queries for (ID i , ID) (with i ∈ {1, 2} and ID = ID 1 , ID 2 ). We can assume that ID's public key pk ID = (Z, X, r) is consistent, so that Z = g 2 )
x for t = ChamH hk (Z||ID; r). To compute the shared key BBS N (g
and Z = g
3k , using the extended Euclidean algorithm in the exponent and the fact that gcd(a(t), α 1 · α 2 · 2 3k ) | 2 2k (which holds because a(t) ≤ 2 2k and the α i > 2 2k are prime). This completes the description of our simulation. Assuming that no ChamH collision occurs, and ignoring the statistical defect arising from the not quite uniform α i mod φ(N )/4, we get the following:
-when B's challenge C equals BBS N (D 2 −k ), then B simulates the CKS-light game with A and a real challenge key; -when B's challenge C is uniform, then B simulates the CKS-light game with A and a random challenge key. Thus, B is a successful BBS distinguisher whenever A is successful in the CKS-light game. (1) follows.
E Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We proceed via a sequence of games. Let S i be the event that A is successful in Game i.
Game 0. Let Game 0 be the original attack game as described in the CKS-light security model. By definition, we have that:
Game 1. (Eliminate hash collisions.) In this game, the challenger changes its answers to register corrupt user ID queries as follows: let A and B be the identities of the two honest users, and let their public keys be (X A , Z A , r A ), (X B , Z B , r B ) respectively. Let D be the identity of a user that is the subject of a register corrupt user ID query with
, the challenger aborts (note that in this case the challenger created a collision in ChamH hk ). Otherwise, it continues as in the previous game.
Let abort ChamH be the event that a collision was found. Until abort ChamH happens, Game 0 and Game 1 are identical. By the difference lemma [40], we have Let p(t) = p 0 + p 1 t + p 2 t 2 be a polynomial of degree 2 over Z p such that p(t A ) = p(t B ) = 0. Let q(t) = q 0 + q 1 t + q 2 t 2 be a random polynomial of degree 2 over Z p . Then B sets u i = (g c 1 ) pi g 1 qi and
, where q(t A ) and q(t B ) are known values. B then answers the following queries:
-Register honest user ID: When B receives a register honest user ID query for identity A from adversary A, it uses the trapdoor information ck of the chameleon hash function to obtain r A ∈ R Cham such that ChamH hk (g a 2 ||A; r A ) = ChamH hk (m 1 ; r 1 ) = t A . Notice that, according to the definition of chameleon hash functions (see Appendix A), r A is uniformly distributed over R Cham and independent from r 1 . Similarly, when B receives a second register honest user ID query for identity B from A, it obtains r B ∈ R Cham such that ChamH hk (g b 2 ||B; r B ) = ChamH hk (m 2 ; r 2 ) = t B . Then r B is also uniformly distributed over R Cham . Now B sets:
These are correct public keys since p(t A ) = p(t B ) = 0. 
and r D ∈ R. This means that
and r D by:
where we use the property that p(t D ) = 0 mod p, which follows from the facts that p is a polynomial of degree 2 with roots t A , t B and that t D = t A , t B (because we have eliminated hash collisions already in Game 1). Now writing pk A = (X A , Z A , r A ) for the public key of the honest user A, the shared key between A and D can be correctly computed as:
-Test query: Return T .
This completes our description of B's simulation. Note that distinguishing the real case from the random case for A in Game 2 is equivalent to solving the DBDH-2 problem. To see this, note that for user A, we have Z A = g K * = SharedKey(ID 1 , pk 1 , ID 2 , sk 2 ), or a random key K from SHK. B sets C * = (ID 2 , pk 2 , σ * ), where σ * ← OTSSign(sigk , pk 2 ) and gives (pk KEM ,K, C * ) to A. A now makes Dec queries which B handles as follows. For each such query with input C, B parses C as (ID , pk , σ ) and check the signature σ using vk = ID . If ID = ID 2 and (pk , σ ) = (pk 2 , σ * ), then we can build another adversary C against the strong security of OTS. (This is done using the same simulation as above with the difference that sk 1 and sk 2 are known but vk comes from the OTS experiment. The signing oracle is used to generate σ * for the challenge ciphertext.) If ID = ID 1 , it returns ⊥. Assuming ID ∈ {ID 1 , ID 2 }, B makes a register corrupt user query on input ID . B then makes a corrupt reveal query on ID 1 , pk 1 , ID , pk to get either a key K ∈ SHK, or ⊥, and returns the result to A.
This completes our description of B's simulation. A's view is identical when playing either against B in this simulation or against its real KEM challenger. Note that in the KEM real game Dec(sk KEM , C), where C = (vk = ID , pk , σ ), should return SharedKey(ID , pk , ID 1 , sk 1 ) or ⊥ if the signature does not verify or if ID = ID 1 . Note also that in the KEM real game, the challenge query should be answered with either Enc(pk KEM ) = (K * , C * ), where K * = SharedKey(ID 1 , pk 1 , ID 2 , sk 2 ) and C * = (ID 2 , pk 2 , σ * ), or a pair (K, C * ), with K chosen at random from SHK. This is exactly what is done in B's simulation.
Whenever A outputs a bitb, B outputs the same bit. Then we have that B's advantage in breaking the NIKE scheme is the same as A's in breaking the KEM. Counting queries made B in response to A's queries completes the proof.
G Simplified NIKE and Public Key Encryption
Here we show how simplified versions of the NIKE definition and the CKS-light security model can be used to build an IND-CCA secure KEM. The essential difference from our previous definitions is that we eliminate all identities from the algorithms in a NIKE scheme, and assume that the adversary works only with distinct public keys, i.e. the adversary is not allowed to register the same public key more than once. Thus we show that a simpler notion of NIKE than we have considered so far suffices for constructing PKE.
We begin by giving our simplified NIKE definition and security model, and finally the simplified conversion itself. We then illustrate the conversion using a simplified version of the NIKE scheme from Section 4.
G.1 Simplified NIKE and Simplified CKS-light Security Model
We now define the simplified NIKE concept as follows. We define an S-NIKE scheme to be a collection of three algorithms CommonSetup, NIKE.KeyGen and SharedKey together with a shared key space SHK.
-S-CommonSetup: As for NIKE.
-S-NIKE.KeyGen: On input params, this randomised algorithm outputs a key pair (pk, sk).
-S-SharedKey: On input a public key pk 1 and a secret key sk 2 , this algorithm outputs either a shared key in SHK for the two keys, or a failure symbol ⊥. This algorithm is assumed to always output ⊥ if sk is the secret key corresponding to pk .
For correctness, we require that, for any pair of key pairs (pk 1 , sk 1 ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ), algorithm S-SharedKey satisfies the constraint S-SharedKey(pk 1 , sk 2 ) = S-SharedKey(pk 2 , sk 1 ).
Our simplified CKS-light security model for S-NIKE is stated in terms of a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. In this game, C takes as input the security parameter 1 k , runs algorithm CommonSetup of the S-NIKE scheme and gives A params. The challenger takes a random bit b and answers oracle queries for A until A outputs a bitb. The challenger answers the following types of queries for A:
-Register honest user : The challenger runs S-NIKE.KeyGen to generate a key pair (pk, sk) and records the tuple (honest, pk, sk). The challenger returns pk to A. A is allowed to make at most 2 such queries; we refer to the components in the responses as being honest keys.
-Register corrupt user : In this type of query, A supplies a public key pk. The challenger records the tuple (corrupt, pk, ⊥). -Corrupt reveal queries: Here A supplies a pair of public keys pk 1 , pk 2 , such that one of the keys was registered as honest and the other as corrupt. The challenger runs S-SharedKey using as input the secret key corresponding to the honest public key and the corrupt public key and returns the result to A. -Test query: If b = 0, the challenger runs S-SharedKey using as input one honest public key and the other honest private key and returns the result to A. If b = 1, the challenger generates a random key from SHK, records it for later, and returns that to the adversary. A makes a single test query.
A's queries may be made adaptively and are arbitrary in number. We demand that all the public keys involved in A's register corrupt user queries are distinct from one another and from the honestly public keys. When the adversary finally outputsb, it wins the game ifb = b. For an adversary A, we define its advantage in this security game as: where q C , q CR are the numbers of register corrupt user queries and corrupt reveal queries made by A, respectively. We say that an S-NIKE scheme is (t, , q C , q CR )-secure in the S-CKS-light model for S-NIKE if there is no adversary with advantage at least that runs in time t and makes at most q C register corrupt user queries and at most q CR corrupt reveal queries. Informally, we say that an S-NIKE scheme is S-CKS-light secure if there is no efficient adversary having non-negligible advantage in k, where efficient means that the running time and numbers of queries made by the adversary are bounded by polynomials in k.
G.2 The Conversion from S-NIKE to KEM
We now present our conversion from an S-NIKE scheme to a KEM. For an S-NIKE scheme S-NIKE, we construct a KEM KEM(S-NIKE) with the following algorithms:
-KEM.KeyGen(1 k ): This algorithm runs the algorithm S-CommonSetup(1 k ) of S-NIKE to obtain a set of system parameters, params. Then it runs S-NIKE.KeyGen(params) to obtain a key pair (pk, sk). It sets pk KEM = pk and sk KEM = sk.
-Enc(pk KEM ): This algorithm parses pk KEM as pk, runs S-NIKE.KeyGen(params) of S-NIKE to obtain a key pair (pk , sk ) and sets C = pk . It then runs S-SharedKey(pk, sk ) of scheme S-NIKE to obtain a key K ∈ SHK. The output is (K, C). -Dec(sk KEM , C): This algorithm parses C as pk and sk KEM as sk. It then runs S-SharedKey(pk , sk) and outputs the result, which may be ⊥ (this will always be so if sk is the secret key corresponding to pk).
Notice that the ciphertexts in this scheme just consist of public keys from the S-NIKE scheme, while the encapsulated keys are elements of SHK. As our next result shows, the resulting KEM is automatically IND-CCA secure if the S-NIKE scheme is secure in the S-CKS-light security model. Theorem 10. Suppose the S-NIKE scheme S-NIKE is secure in the S-CKS-light security model. Then KEM(S-NIKE) is an IND-CCA secure KEM. More precisely, for any adversary A against KEM(S-NIKE), there exists an adversary B against S-NIKE in the S-CKS-light security model having the same advantage. Moreover, if A makes q D decapsulation queries, then B makes q D register corrupt user queries and q D corrupt reveal queries, while B's running time is roughly the same as that of A.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against KEM(S-NIKE). We build B, an adversary against the S-NIKE scheme in the S-CKS-light security model. B, on input params, a set of system parameters, makes two register honest user queries receiving public keys pk 1 , pk 2 . B then sets pk KEM = pk 1 . B also makes a test query on pk 1 , pk 2 . It receives in reply a valueK, which is either the real key, K * = S-SharedKey(pk 1 , sk 2 ), or a random key K from SHK. B sets C * = pk 2 and gives (pk KEM ,K, C * ) to A. A now makes Dec queries which B handles as follows. For each such query with input C, B parses C as pk . Since C = C * , we have pk = pk 2 . If pk = pk 1 , then B outputs ⊥, which is consistent with the rejection rule for decapsulation in the scheme KEM(S-NIKE). Otherwise, B makes a register corrupt user query on input pk (here we assume all of A's Dec queries are distinct without loss of generality, so that all these register corrupt user queries are on distinct keys). B then makes a corrupt reveal query on pk 1 , pk to get either a key K ∈ SHK, or ⊥, and returns the result to A. This completes our description of B's simulation. A's view is identical when playing either against B in this simulation or against its real KEM challenger. Note that in the KEM real game Dec(sk KEM , C), where C = pk , should return S-SharedKey(pk , sk 1 ). Note also that in the KEM real game, the challenge query should be answered with either Enc(pk KEM ) = (K * , C * ), where K * = SharedKey(pk 1 , sk 2 ) and C * = pk 2 , or a pair (K, C * ), with K chosen at random from SHK. This is exactly what is done in B's simulation.
Whenever A outputs a bitb, B outputs the same bit. Then we have that B's advantage in breaking the NIKE scheme is the same as A's in breaking the KEM. Counting queries made B in response to A's queries completes the proof. 2 ), and the secret key is sk KEM = x A ∈ Z p .
-Enc(pk KEM ): This algorithm parses pk KEM as pk A , runs S-NIKE.KeyGen(params) of S-NIKE dbdh-2 to obtain a key pair (pk B , sk B ) and sets C = pk B . It then runs S-SharedKey(pk A , sk B ) of scheme S-NIKE dbdh-2 to obtain a key K ∈ SHK. The ciphertext C then consists of two group elements:
2 )
x B
, g
where x B $ ← − Z p and t B = TCR f (g
). The encapsulated key is calculated as the group element K = e(S x B , Z A ) ∈ G T , where pk A = (X A , Z A ). -Dec(sk KEM , C): This algorithm parses C as pk B = (X B , Z B ) and sk KEM as x A . It then runs S-SharedKey(pk B , sk A ), and returns the result, which is either e(S x A , Z B ) ∈ G T or ⊥.
The IND-CCA security of this KEM is guaranteed by Theorems 10 and 11, assuming the hardness of the DBDH-2 problem relative to generator G2. Our KEM KEM(S-NIKE), obtained from the S-NIKE scheme S-NIKE dbdh-2 , benefits from short public keys and secret keys (just the public keys and secret keys of S-NIKE dbdh-2 ) and short ciphertexts (just the public keys of S-NIKE dbdh-2 ). This KEM is comparable to the one proposed in [29] : both schemes have the same size of ciphertext, two group elements, and for both, decapsulation requires a ciphertext check and the evaluation of a bilinear map twice. The encapsulation key consists of only one group element. Also, the public keys and private keys generated by KEM.KeyGen are shorter than the ones in the KEM proposed in [29] (two group elements and one element in Z p , respectively).
